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APPENDIX I
We tested whether alternative specifications of the standard errors affects our empirical results substantially. First, we followed Lewis and Linzer's (2005) idea of an estimated variable regression strategy more closely and employed a weighted least squares approach in order to account for differences across contexts in the standard deviations of the coefficients in the first stage of the analysis. As indicated by the first model in Table 2 , the effect size of populist party establishment remains-once again-stable, while the standard error is reduced. In the case of the two further covariates, standard errors increase, but the effects remain statistically significant.
In the second model of table 2, we repeated the calculation of the main model but did not employ clustered standard errors. In the case of small cluster sizes, standard errors could drastically rise and, hence, cause type-I errors. This is not the case since the standard error of the establishment measure decreases in our test. The effects of the two control variables remain equally significant although the corresponding standard errors increase. In the third model, we used the centered inverted standard errors of the estimates for external efficacy of the first step as weights for the second step regression to account for differences in the reliability of the first step coefficients.
Again, the results remain stable. Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1. To disentangle the effect of external efficacy, we need to control for alternative sources of support for populist parties. For this purpose, we refer to a wider range of the literature on electoral behavior and on populist-party support. We include internal efficacy as a first control variable on the individual level. Concerning political self-assurance or awareness of their own political competence, we assume that people who feel overwhelmed by the complexity of the political world are particularly likely to support populist parties whose dichotomous solutions should be attractive to them.
Second, the criticism of elites articulated by populist parties should not only be examined in relation to national elites. Although the degree of Euro-skepticism in populist parties varies across countries (Arzheimer 2015, 537) , the European Union is a particular focus of criticism.
Targeting the technocratic culture and weak 'accountability' of European institutions, populist parties claim that Europeanization has opened a growing gap between the interests of national populations and the decisions of the European political elites. Furthermore, the fundamental nonfinality of the idea of European unification together with the EU's institutional structure involving laborious negotiation and compromise is diametrically opposed to the populist idea of politics as the execution of a supposedly clear popular will. Another common motive for populist voting behavior is therefore seen in the rejection or negative evaluation of European institutions Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1.
